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TORTS
By CHARLES J. HILKEY*
In considering a summary of the tort cases during the year, it is found
among the numerous decisions, many merely restate principles which are
well established and contain nothing that is novel. Other cases, however,
deserve special consideration because they contain graphic statements of
old doctrines; apply such doctrines to new facutal situations; or announce
new legal principles. These decisions only will be included in the following
discussion.
Trover.-An action of trover was brought for conversion of property
stored in a warehouse and evidenced by warehouse receipts issued by the
warehouseman and pledged to a bank for money owed the bank and transferred by the bank to an indemnity company which in turn transferred
them to the plaintiff. The property represented by the warehouse receipts
was delivered to the defendant. The court held that under the Uniform
Warehouse Receipts Act, the above transfers of the receipts constituted
a constructive delivery and defendant was liable for conversion of the
property.'

Malicious Prosecution.-Where petition alleged that the plaintiff was
arrested under a warrant sworn out by the defendants and that he was
confined in jail for approximately nine hours and thereafter transferred
to another jail and confined for another hour before being released on bond
and that thereafter he was forced to appear before a judge for a commitment hearing and at that time the defendants announced in open court
that the case would not be prosecuted further and signed a dismissal on
the docket and the judge then marked the warrant "withdrawn," the
action was for malicious prosecution and not for malicious arrest. In such
action the defendant may show that he acted on advice of counsel but although this will go to the mitigation of damages it is not sufficient to show
that he acted with probable cause. Advice of counsel is of no more effect than
that of the solicitor general and in both cases "it must appear that such advice was given after a full and fair statement to the attorney of all the facts
*Visiting Professor of Law, Stetson University, 1951; Visiting Professor of Law,
University of Georgia, 1948-1951; Dean Emeritus, Lamar School of Law, Emory
University; A.B., 1905, College of Emporia; A.M., 1907, University of Kansas;
Ph.D., 1910, Columbia University; J.D., 1915, University of Michigan Law School;
S.J.D., 1924, Harvard University Law School; Member American and Georgia Bar
Associations.
1. Graham v. Frazier, 82 Ga. App. 185, 60 S.E.2d 833 (1950). In Meders v. Wirchball, 83 Ga. App. 408, 63 S.E.2d 674 (1951), the owner of an automobile, which he
left with a used car dealer to be repaired, was not estopped from asserting title as
against one who purchased the car from such dealer. Nor is the owner of an automobile estopped to assert title where he has left the automobile with a used car
dealer under an arrangement whereby the owner and the dealer are to divide the
profits made in selling the car but the dealer executed a bill of sale to the bank
for security for a loan. (East Atlanta Bank v. Nicholson, 83 Ga. App. 557, 63
S.E.2d 699 (1951)). Plaintiff is entitled to an alternative verdict in a trover action,,
but he must allege the value of the property to be so entitled if the defendant
resists such privilege. (Watson v. Tompkins Chevrolet Co., 83 Ga. App. 440, 63,
S.E.2d 681 (1951)).
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relating to the offense and known to the prosecutor. Whether this is so is
a jury question." 2
Defamation: Libel.-In an alleged libel which involved publication in
a newspaper of a petition filed in the federal court against certain defendants, among them plaintiff in the libel suit, the court distinguished
between absolute and conditional privilege. The former comprises a small
class of communications and is practically limited to legislative and judicial
proceedings and other acts of state. Here malice is not material. But in
the case of conditionally privileged communications, the privilege is lost
if the publication is actuated by malice. A newspaper article that reports
a judicial proceeding and is substantially accurate and is published in good
faith is privileged. As to the article in question, it gave a substantially
accurate account of the petition that was filed in the federal court and
although malice may be inferred from libelous headlines, the one published in this case, reading, "Another $300,000 Suit Is Filed In Race
Case," is not of that character. Furthermore, the fact that the petition
in the federal court was filed only thirty minutes before the paper went to,
press, before service therein, is not material. The "suit became a matter
of public record the moment it was marked filed in the clerk's office, regardless of whether it had been served or not." But since the petition
alleged express malice in general terms, it was good against a general
demurrer and "the case will be submitted to the jury on the question as
to whether the defendant here is guilty of express malice in the publication
of the proceedings, though fair and honest."" The Court of Appeals had
already decided that the conditional privilege enjoyed by a newspaper in
publishing an account of a judicial proceeding is lost through the actual
malice of the reporter.' In such case the malice of the servant is imputable
to the master. The court followed the later English cases and also applied
by analogy the general doctrine of master and servant in Georgia. As to
damages the court said, "It has long been the law in this State that where
an agent tortiously commits a malicious act which is otherwise within the
scope of his authority, his bad faith may be considered to increase the
damages." So the existence of actual malice on the part of the reporter
2. Peppas v. Miles, 82 Ga. App. 438, 61 S.E.2d 429 (1950). In Georgia both malice
and want of probable cause are questions for the jury. Anderson v. Keller, 67 Ga.
58 (1881) ; Thornton v. Story, 24 Ga. App. 503, 101 S.E. 309 (1919); GA. CODE
§§ 105-801 et seq. (1933).
3. Shiver v. Valdosta Press, 82 Ga. App. 406, 61 S.E.2d 221 (1950). Fair and honest
relates to the reporting itself and not to the state of mind of the reporter or publisher. Note that in this class of conditional privilege it is not necessary that the
publisher believe the matter charged in the court proceeding and have reasonable
grounds for such belief as in other conditionally privileged communications as long
as there is no actual malice. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §§ 600, 601, 611, comment
a (1938).
4. Atlanta Journal Co. v. Doyal, 82 Ga. App. 321, 60 S.E.2d 802 (1950).
5. Id. at 335, 60 S.E.2d at 814. The court further stated that where there was actual
malice there may be punitive damages awarded, but not for wounded feelings and
this is true even though the measure of damages is only limited by the enlightened
consciences of impartial jurors, for to allow this item under both would be awarding double damages. And under CODE § 20-1404 (1933), the plaintiff may be entitled to expenses of litigation for the bad faith specified in the Code "in actions
sounding in tort, means bad faith in the transaction out of which the cause of
action arose."
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may be'imputed to the newspaper for two purposes, (i) to take away the
conditional privilege and (2) to justify additional damages.
Fraud and Decit.-Failure to comply with the requirements of the
Bulk Sales Law by a seller and purchaser is conclusively presumed to be
fraudulent as to a creditor who is not paid. This principle was applied to
the sale of a drugstore where the purchase price was placed in escrow for
the purpose of paying valid debts of the seller but the creditors were not
notified. The fund was largely exhausted when a creditor presented his
claim. He then brought suit against the seller and garnisheed the purchaser. It was held that the garnishee would be liable for the full amount
of the claim.' Where there is a fraud on the court, as in the case of an
administrator who secures a discharge although knowing of claims and
failing to divulge their existence to the court, his discharge will be set
aside.' In Georgia, it must be shown in an action of fraud and deceit that
the actor knew that his representations were false. This principle was
applied where the defendant sought to setoff certain expenses incurred
due to misrepresentations on the part of the plaintiff in the sale of bags
of flour. Since it did not appear that the representations made by the
plaintiff were consciously untrue, defendant's claim of set-off was based
on implied warranty and a proper plea to an action ol open account.8
Furthermore, the party injured must show due diligence on his part as one
of the elements of a cause of action for fraud and deceit. This principle
was applied where the plaintiff brought action to recover damages for a
misrepresentation made to her to induce her to sell certain timber land. '
Trespass to Real Property.-One who held timber rights which he
assigned to another and who goes with the assignee and knowingly points
out a boundary line which is in part on plaintiff's land, the assignee being
ignorant of the true line, is liable to the plaintiff for trespass by the assignee
in cutting timber on plaintiff's land. In such case the defendant is liable
as having procured the trespass on the part of his assignee. The word
"procure" as used in the Code1" "does not require the lending of assistance
in the actual perpetration of the wrong done by another." It is sufficient
if one acts "only through advice, counsel, persuasion, or command" in
perpetrating the wrong in which case "the procurer becomes liable for the
injury, either singly or jointly with the actual perpetrator." Included within
the principle is a situation in which the procurer "does an act which ordinarily or naturally produces the trespass." A verdict awarding damages
was authorized.1 In an action against the defendant for damages claimed
for destruction of flowers and shrubbery on a cemetery lot of the plaintiff,
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Mitchell v. Waller, 83 Ga. App. 7, 62 S.E.2d 383 (1950).
Harris v. Birnbaum, 82 Ga. App. 653, 62 S.E.2d 204 (1950).
C. M. Miller Co. v. Ramey, 82 Ga. App. 807, 62 S.E.2d 768 (1950).
Watkins v. Mertz, 83 Ga. App. 115, 62 S.E.2d 744 (1950).
Section 105-1207 (1933).
Melton v. Helms, 83 Ga. App. 71, 62 S.E.2d 663 (1950). Judge Felton dissented
on the ground that the procuring would apply only where the lease included the
plaintiff's land. Oral misrepresentation as to a boundary line is not sufficient when
the lease contains a perfect description of the lands upon which the timber lies.
"All apparently applicable Georgia cases are those where the description in the
written conveyance includes a third person's property. The foreign cases cited
are either similar to the Georgia cases or are cases where the sale is an oral sale
and the rule in such cases is the same as the cases involving written instruments."
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the court held that an action of trespass to land would lie. Such action will
lie as to a cemetery lot in favor of one who owns it in fee simple or one
who has a burial easement therein. "Such an action lies for the actual
damage inflicted plus punitive damages allowable." 12
WJVillful and Wanton Conduct.-Somewhere between intentional and
negligent conduct lies the zone of willful and wanton conduct. This concept
partakes in part of the elements of each of the others. Its nature is well
discussed in a criminal case in which the accused was convicted of reckless
driving.1" The court said, "The words 'willful or wanton' in both our civil
and criminal statutes and decisions have a well established, clear and
definite meaning under our legal jurisprudence."' 4 The cases the court
discussed adhere closely to the definition of recklessness contained in the
Restatement of Torts." From a discussion of the cases in the civil law the
court concludes that "It will thus be seen that even in our civil law the words
'willful and wanton' mean more than ordinary negligence." In the instant
case, it was held error, however, to give the prosecutor a portion of the
fine as compensation for injury to his car. Another situation in which the
defendant must be charged with wanton or reckless conduct in order for
the plaintiff to recover is injury to one riding on a free pass on a railroad
in interstate commerce. In a case involving such a passenger, the court cited
with approval the definition of the term "recklessness" adopted in the Restatement of Torts.'" However, the court stated that whether the defendant
is guilty of wanton or reckless conduct is a question for the jury where
reasonable minds might differ. 7
12. West View Corp. v. Alexander, 83 Ga. App. 810, 65 S.E.2d 38 (1951). Compare
with action of ejectment where plaintiff has only an easement for burial purposes.
Stewart v. Garrett, 119 Ga. 386, 46 S.E. 427 (1904). Heirs of one buried may bring
action for desecration of a grave as well as the heirs of the owner of the fee or
burial rights. 14 C.J.S. 95-96 (1939). At common law, an action for injury to an
easement would be trespass on the case.
13. Lancaster v. State, 83 Ga. App. 746, 64 S.E.2d 902 (1951).
14. Id. at 756, 64 S.E.2d at 909.
15. Section 500 (1934).

16. Ibid.
17.

Arrington v. Trammell, 83 Ga. App. 107, 62 S.E.2d 451 (1950). In this case the
court said that, "For the reason that the employee was riding a free pass, issued
pursuant to the Hepburn Act, 49 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1(7), mere negligence on the part
of the railroad company and its servants would be insufficient to sustain a cause of
action against it." There must be wantonness to support an action against the
railroad. It is of interest to note that the cited Hepburn Act specified only the
persons or occasions with respect to which free passes may be issued and does not
relieve the railroads from liability for negligence in such cases. However, free
passes are usually issued with a provision that "the user assumes all risk of
injury to person or property and of loss of property whether by negligence or
otherwise, and absolves the issuing company . . . from any liability therefor."
The United States Supreme Court, in Francis v. Southern Pacific Co., 333 U.S. 445,
68 S.Ct. 611, 92 L. Ed. 798 (1948), held that in view of federal legislation with respect to interstate commerce, the defense of the railroad would be determined by federal and not state law and where a pass had been issued with such limitation of liability, the railroad company would not be liable for ordinary negligence regardless
of the state law. Furthermore, since federal law has occupied the field, there is
no room for the application of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 S.Ct.
817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938). Two justices concurred in a strong dissent. There is no
conflict between the federal law as laid down in the Francis case and the Georgia
law since it has been held by the Court of Appeals that a pass containing such
relief from liability would cover ordinary negligence but not wanton or reckless
conduct. Wright v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 18 Ga. App. 290, 89 S.E. 457 (1916) ;
Forster v. Southern Ry. Co., 39 Ga. App. 216, 146 S.E. 516 (1929). However, it
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The Avoidance Ruie.-In a situation where the plaintiff's automobile hit
an oncoming truck which swerved to its left in front of plaintiff's car, resulting in the injuries claimed and the defendant alleged that plaintiff was exceeding the speed limit, it was held error to instruct the jury "that the duty
to exercise ordinary care and diligence on the part of the plaintiff does not
arise until the danger to him and his property arises and is apparent." The
court said-this was error because "There is a duty on the part of every
operator of a vehicle on the public highways to exercise ordinary care at all
times in the operation of the vehicle, for his own safety and the safety of
others." The court stated further that, "When in the exercise of such care
an apparent danger becomes discoverable, caused by the negligence of another, it is the duty of the operator of the vehicle to exercise ordinary care
to avoid the consequences of the other's negligence."' 8
JWrongful Death 4ctions.-Where a brakeman was injured and sued for
damages and thereafter died, his widow as executrix was substituted as
plaintiff and she sought to recover also for his death. As to the cause requiring the amputation of the deceased's leg prior to his death and also the
cause of his death, it would be sufficient if the injuries received greatly aggravated the diseased condition of his leg and subsequently hastened his
death. She is entitled to recover damages that the deceased would have been
entitled to recover had he lived, and this would include pain and suffering
determined by the enlightened consciences of impartial jurors. With respect
to the damages in the death action, these would be the financial benefits
which would be expected from the decedent to the widow and children. As
to the children, it would be such pecuniary loss as each would suffer as to
care, counsel, and training which would have to be supplied by others for
compensation through minority. The wife would be entitled to such sum as
the deceased would have earned during his expectancy or the wife's expectancy if shorter. In each case the sum should be reduced to its present
cash value.'" According to the Georgia wrongful death statutes, in order
is still an open question where passes are issued without limitation of liability
and where a pass is used only for intrastate travel, if there be such an area now
left. Note further, that a contract limiting liability generally is considered valid
as to ordinary negligence but not as to intentional injuries, wanton or reckless
conduct, and, in some cases, gross negligence. 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 1751B
(Rev. ed. 1938) ; Note, 4 Mo. L. Rav. 55; 12 AM. JUR., Contracts §§ 177, 183 (1938).
18. Martin v. Waltman, 82 Ga. App. 375, 61 S.E.2d 214 (1950). Although the instruction was objectionable, the court's comment thereon is not clear. The avoidance
rule does not apply to a previously negligent plaintiff. His negligence, if any,
before the avoidance duty arises should be weighed under the comparative negligence rule. Since in the instant case the negligence of the parties is concurrent, there
is no room for the application of the rule. And even though the plaintiff was exceeding the speed limit, which would be negligence per se, the element of causation
is absent. See Mahoney v. Beatman, 110 Conn. 184, 147 Atl. 762 (1929). A true
application of the avoidance rule is found where a city negligently places a noparking sign immediately under a show window over which plaintiff stumbled in
having her attention fixed on the contents of the window. Here defendant's negligence preceded that of plaintiff, but it is still a jury question whether under the
circumstances plaintiff is negligent in not discovering defendant's negligence. "One
is not bound to the same degree of care in discovering or apprehending danger in
moments of stress or excitement or when the attention has been necessarily diverted
as at other times." (Glover v. City Council of Augusta, 83 Ga. App. 314, 63 S.E.2d
422 (1951)).
19. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brown, 82 Ga. App. 889, 62 S.E.2d 736 (1950). This
action was brought under the Federal Employer's Liability Act and must be distinguished as to damages from an action brought under the Georgia wrongful
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for the mother to recover for the full value of the life of the child, there
must be both dependency and actual contribution. "A child two years, two
months and twenty-four days of age alleged to have been 'unusually large
for his age, having the mental capacity of a child of at least S or 6 years of
age, strong, robust, precocious and capable of and actually running errands
around the house and in the store operated by petitioner and her husband,'
was not too young as a matter of law to render valuable services to his
mother. Such question is one for a jury."" ° The Code makes no provision
for the children of a deceased father to bring an action for his wrongful
homicide while the widow, though a stepmother, is still living,2" and
although it is alleged by the children that a settlement made for the homicide of their father was fraudulent, the court would not set the same aside
after two years from the discovery of the fraud. 2
Malpractice.-A person suffering from an injury or ailment is entitled
to a thorough and careful examination and treatment under the circumstances. As to diligence, the physician must exercise the care as is done by
the members of his profession. Matters relating to diagnosis and treatment
are to be established by physicians as expert witnesses. "No layman, juror
or court will be permitted to say what is the proper method in diagnosing
and treating a case. A layman may testify as to the results."",
Unwholesome Food.-Where plaintiff becomes ill from eating alleged
unwholesome food in a restaurant, under the Georgia law the defendant is
liable for negligence and not under an implied warranty. In such case a
petition charging negligence in general terms, as in other negligence cases, is
sufficient as against a general demurrer. An allegation
of knowledge of the
2
unwholesomeness of the food is not necessary.
Comparative Negligence.-Where the evidence is conflicting as to the
negligence of both the deceased and the defendant in a wrongful death
action involving the death of plaintiff's husband struck by defendant's
automobile, "the jury was authorized to find that both plaintiff (defendant?) and deceased were negligent, to determine the negligence of each,
and to return a verdict consistent therewith based on the comparativenegligence doctrine. 2 5
Joint Tortfeasors.-In cases in which separate and distinct acts of negligence on the part of different defendants combine to cause the homicide
in a death action, all may be sued and the jury may return a verdict against
one or more as the evidence authorizes. But where the verdict is in favor
of all, and illegal as a matter of law as to one of them because in default
at time of trial, the court can segregate the verdict and set it aside as to

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

death statutes. The case is especially noteworthy for the full and excellent instructions of Judge Moore in the trial court.
Yarbrough v. Levinson Bros., 84 Ga. App. 131, 65 S.E.2d 286 (1951).
Odom v. Atlanta & W. P. R. Co., 78 Ga. App. 477, 51 S.E.2d 466 (1949).
Odom v. Atlanta & W. P. R. Co., 208 Ga. 45, 64 S.E.2d 889 (1951). Whether the
court would have set the settlement aside for fraud, had the suit been brought
within two years is left an open question.
Mayo v. McClung, 83 Ga. App. 548, 64 S.E.2d 330 (1951).
Yeo v. Pig 'n Whistle Sandwich Shops, 83 Ga. App. 91, 62 S.E.2d 668 (1950).
Bryson v. Lee, 82 Ga. App. 689, 62 S.E.2d 405 (1950).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3'

that defendant alone."6 In a three-vehicle collision involving defendant's;
large truck and trailer, a verdict and judgment against the master was.
upheld though there was no finding of negligence against the driver. This
conclusion was justified under a rule of the Georgia Public Service Com-mission and the Interstate Commerce Commission, prohibiting a driver
from operating a common carrier truck on the highways of this state for
more tharr ten consecutive hours and in this case the driver had operated
the truck for over fifteen hours. This was negligence per se, and in viewof the purpose of the rule, is wider than the doctrine of respondeat superior. 7 Drive-it-Yourself vehicles have given rise to many suits for dam-.
ages. In such a case where the brakes of an automobile were defective
causing the car to swerve off the road when applied on a curve striking
the plaintiff who was standing near the highway, both the bailor and thebailee were held liable. The court restated the rule that where a bailor
entrusts a machine for immediate use to another he has the duty of using
ordinary care to ascertain that the automobile has no hidden defects which
would render it dangerous to those within the range of foreseeable operation. Here the bailees admitted in their pleading that the brakes were defective when they rented the automobile and consequently they too wereheld liable. 8
Landlord and Tenant.--Tenant in an apartment house tripped over a
toy wagon left on a walkway adjoining the apartment building and. was
injured. It was at night and the walkway was not lighted. The court said
that there was no duty to keep the way lighted in the absence of a contract
or statutory duty to do so. But here a rule contained in all the leases obliged
the tenants not to permit children's toys or other obstructions on the walkways. Assuming, said the court, that such rule imposed a duty on the part
of the landlord, liability would depend upon actual or constructive notice.
The latter would arise as an inference from the facts such as the length of
time during which obstructions continued which is not present in the in-stant case. 2
Injury to Contract Rights.-The city employed the plaintiff to repair
an electric light system located in a baseball park. The plaintiff employed
the defendant to construct concrete bases around certain poles. Defendant
excavated around one of the poles without bracing it and the pole fell and'
the equipment on it was damaged or destroyed. Plaintiff repaired or replaced this equipment and then sued the defendant for damages in a tort
action. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount
26. Hawkins v. Benton Rapid Express, Inc., 82 Ga. App. 819, 62 S.E.2d 612 (1950).
The court reiterated the rule that evidence of negligence in the operation of an.
automobile on other occasions is not relevant.
27. Reliable Transfer Co. v. Gabriel, 84 Ga. App. 54, 65 S.E.2d 679 (1951).
28. Hertz Drive-Ur-Self Stations, Inc. v. Benson, 83 Ga. App. 866, 65 S.E.2d 191
(1951). The individual defendants, bailees, admitted in their original answer that
the brakes were defective when they rented the automobile, and that they were
driving at an excessive speed. But it is quite a different thing to admit that the
brakes were defective when they rented the automobile and to admit knowledge
of such defect, but it may still be urged that the excessive speed was a concurrent
cause with the defective brakes although the latter fact was not known to the,
bailees. If the injury is predicated on the defective brakes, knowledge there must
be chargeable to the bailees in order to hold them liable.
29. Phillips v. Ray-Jean, Inc., 84 Ga. App. 38, 65 S.E.2d 617 (1951).
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of loss occasioned by the negligence of the defendant." Assuming the pole
and equipment are personal property, the decision may be supported on
the liability of sub-bailee to bailee. Assuming that they are real property,
the principle may be the liability of sub-contractor to general contractor.
Or, whether real or personal property, liability may be predicated on the
master and servant relation. However, in the case of a servant or subcontractor, the recovery would be based on indemnity which is an ex contractu action and the action in the instant case is ex delicto. It would seem
that the court is recognizing a new principle of law and is basing the decision on negligent injury to the contract right existing between the city
and the plaintiff. This is a considerable step in advance. Usually the courts
have denied recovery where the injury was to a contract right existing
between other persons.' Under the contract with the city the plaintiff was
duty bound to use ordinary care as to the equipment. Defendant's negligence involved that contract obligation and resulted in loss to the plaintiff.
It would not be material whether defendant injures the property through
negligence in performing his contract with plaintiff or as a third person
negligently injures the property. In the instant case the defendant knew,
of course, of the contract between the city and plaintiff, and this fact has
been emphasized by certain writers, but such fact has not influenced the
courts

2

Liability of Vendors and AIanufacturers.-Georgia has taken a considerable step in advance in imposing liability on the manufacturer of
chattels. From a retail dealer who had no knowledge of the quality, the
plaintiff bought paint manufactured by the defendant and represented to
come up to certain specifications. Through the negligence of the defendant
the paint was defective. Plaintiff painted the interior of a government post
office and because of the poor quality of the paint the work was rejected.
He then bought other paint and performed the job again which was accepted and sued the defendant for the full amount of his loss. The court
held that he could recover. The decision approved and followed the doctrine of a minority of jurisdictions which have extended the liability for
negligence in such cases to injuries to property as well as to the person.
But even this minority has not gone farther than injury to property rights.
In the instant case,33 the liability of the manufacturer is extended to injury
to a contract right.

Taking or Damaging Property.-Plaintiff sued the city for damages
caused by dumping dirt, garbage, refuse, cinders, ashes and tin cans upon
his land. The action was brought on the ground of creating a nuisance;
taking and damaging private property for a public purpose without just
compensation; and trespass to the land. The court said that the petition
30. Dale Electric Co. v. Thurston, 82 Ga. App. 516, 61 S.E.2d 584 (1950).
31. PROSSER, TORTS, 991 et seq. (1941); Carpenter, Interference with Contract Relations, 41 HARV. L. REV. 728, 737-742 (1928).
32. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 28.
33. Eades v. Spencer-Adams Paint Co., 82 Ga. App. 123, 60 S.E.2d 543 (1950). The
court quoted with approval from the opinion in Ellis v. Lindmark, 177 Minn. 390,
225 N.W. 395 (1929), in which the damage resulted from feeding chickens linseed
oil sold as cod liver oil and liability was imposed. Compare the instant case with
Dale Electric Co. v. Thurston, note 27 supra, where liability for negligent injuries
is extended to a contract right.
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alleged a good cause of action on any one of the three theories but reversed the judgment of the lower court on the ground that the pleading
was duplicitous and a special demurrer should have been sustained for
that reason.34 Where plaintiff's building was destroyed by removal of lateral
support in the city's excavating a ditch along the sidewalk abutting plaintiff's property, for the purpose of laying cables and wires to a city fire
station signal center, recovery was allowed against both the contractor
and the city. Although the establishment of fire stations and appurtenances
thereto is a governmental function and the city is not chargeable with the
negligence of its officers or employees in performing such function, yet when
private property is taken or damaged in such performance, the party injured may recover just compensation under the constitutional guarantee.
This guarantee applies to compensation for property damaged as well as
property actually taken. 5
Right of Privacy.-The right of privacy is well established in Georgia
and is of long standing. In a case36 where an arresting officer entered the
plaintiff's home and without a warrant and without proper authority arrested the husband in the night time and with considerable confusion, the
invasion of the wife's right of privacy was recognized. Such right is guaranteed by the State Constitution37 in so far as it involves "unreasonable
searches and seizures" and when the husband is improperly arrested under
the alleged circmustances the wife is entitled to a cause of action for invasion of her right of privacy. Recovery was denied on other grounds.
Although the right of privacy is derived from natural law, the court deems
it guaranteed as against public officers by the constitution and that such
guarantee would seem to extend to members of the household. Under
certain circumstances, an officer or even a private person may make an
arrest without a warrant, but the offense for which it is made must in
34. City of Atlanta v. Minder, 83 Ga. App. 295, 63 S.E.2d 420 (1951).
35. City of Atlanta v. Kenny, 83 Ga. App. 823, 64 S.E.2d 912 (1951). The distinction
between liability of a city for negligence of its servants in the exercise of a governmental function and the exercise of a ministerial function was emphasized in
an action brought against the city for negligent injury to a prisoner. The prisoner
was ordered to work in an excavation, the walls of which caved in resulting in
permanent personal injuries. The codrt held that working prisoners is a governmental function. City of Atlanta v. Hurley, 83 Ga. App. 879, 65 S.E.2d 44 (1951).
However, two judges of the six judge court concurred because they thought that
they were bound by the decision of the Supreme Court in Nisbet v. City of Atlanta,
97 Ga. 650, 25 S.E. 173 (1896). Judge Felton, dissenting, distinguished the case
from the Nisbet case in that in the latter the injury resulting in death was a part
of the confinement. Had the negligence here injured a third person, the city would
have been liable. He concluded that in working prisoners, the ministerial function
is dominant and the governmental function incidental. It may be pointed out that
the Nisbet case is over a half century old and that within that time marked changes
have occurred in the social and legal attitude toward prisoners. Furthermore, the
cause of death in the Nisbet case was due to the failure to provide medical treatment which is an entirely different matter. 41 AM. JUR., Prisons and Prisoners
§ 24 (1942). It is to be regretted that the case was not sent to the Supreme Court
for further consideration. Closely related to a city's immunity from the negligence
of its servants is that of a charity. However, a hospital that accepts paying patients
is liable to them for the negligence of its servants, but only to the extent of the
income derived from the paying patients or from other noncharitable sources.
Community Hospital, Inc. v. Latimer, 83 Ga. App. 6, 62 S.E.2d 379 (1950), and
cases therein cited.
36. Walker v. Whittle, 83 Ga. App. 445, 64 S.E.2d 87 (1951).
37. Art. I, § 1, 16, GA. CODE § 2-116 (1948 Rev.) ; see also GA. CODE § 26-1502 (1933).
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general be committed in his presence; and in the absence of such evidence
it is error to charge the privilege.38
Law of the Road.-The plaintiff was injured and his automobile demolished at an intersection of a state road and a city street. He was approaching from the right on the street and defendant's truck loaded with logs
was approaching from the left. In order to avoid a collision the driver
,of the truck turned the truck to the right. The logs were thrown from the
truck and caused the injuries of which the plaintiff complained. There was
a stop sign on the right of the street at the intersection but the plaintiff
did not stop before entering the highway. It appeared that the stop sign
was not erected by the authorization of proper city authorities. The Court
of Appeals held that the law of the state requiring a vehicle approaching
from the left to yield the right of way to one approaching from the right
applied in cities as well as in the country and although a city might boulevard certain streets and require vehicles to come to a stop before entering
the intersection, nevertheless, a driver after stopping and then entering
the intersection from the right is accorded the right of way. Furthermore,
a stop sign not erected by the proper authorization of the city "would
not require the plaintiff to obey it and the truck driver on the left would
rely at his peril upon it being official."" The case was carried to the Supreme
Court on a writ of certiorari where the judgment of the Court of Appeals
was reversed." The Court of Appeals said that the failure of the truck
driver to stop constituted negligence per se "and no jury question is presented as to whether or not under the rules of the common law the stop
sign, even if unofficial, required the plaintiff to stop at the intersection."
Thus the Court of Appeals seems to indicate "that negligence per se has
a superior legal weight to negligence as determined by a jury. Such a distinction does not exist as a matter of law." 4 ' The difference between them
is in the mode of establishing negligence. In the instant case the jury might
have found the plaintiff negligent as a matter of fact. The stop sign though
not erected by proper authorization was competent evidence to go to the
jury. And although failure to obey the sign was not negligence per se, it
was a jury question whether plaintiff's failure to stop was negligence on
his part. "The existence of a stop sign though unofficial, and the failure of
the plaintiff to heed the sign, were relevant matters in a consideration of the
diligence and negligence of the parties under the circumstances in this case,
and such matters should have been submitted to the jury." Speed in a certain
zone greater than that established by the Department of Public Safety,
is not negligence per se as to one not intended to be affected by such rules.;
and this is true as to the speed limit in school zones the purpose of which
is to protect children and others on their way to and from school.4 The
requirement that vehicles not in motion shall be parked with their right
sides as near the right side of the highway as practicable does not apply
to temporary stops made as a normal and reasonable incident to traffic
conditions existing at the time. Where defendant's driver was backing out
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Goodwin v. Allen, 83 Ga. App. 615, 64 S.E.2d 212 (1951).
Tyson v. Shoemaker, 83 Ga. App. 33, 62 S.E.2d 586 (1950).
208 Ga. 28, 65 S.E.2d 163 (1951).
Id. at 31, 65 S.E.2d at 165.
Grant v. McKiernan, 82 Ga. App. 82, 60 S.E.2d 794 (1950).
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of a space where trucks were parked off the street but at right angles
thereto and headed away from the street and stopped to let another car
pass behind it and plaintiff's station wagon struck the truck resulting in
the injuries alleged, it was error for the court to instruct the jury that
failure to comply with the requirement was negligence per se. The statutory
requirement not applying, negligence under the facts was a jury question.4
Injuries by the Operation of Railroads.-In many recent cases the rule
as enacted in the Code44 that damages done to persons and property by
the running of locomotives or cars shall be prima facie evidence of the want
of reasonable skill and care has been applied. This provision was enacted
by statute after the decision of the United States Supreme Court had
declared an earlier statute unconstitutional. 5 The effect of the present presumption is to make out a prima facie case which will carry the issues to
the jury. When the railroad company "introduces evidence from which a
jury would be authorized to find that the injury did not so occur or that
if it did it was not due to the negligence of the defendant," the presumption vanishes from the case. 6 Where the presumption is not relied on but
the plaintiff goes on with his evidence then the entire evidence goes to the
jury and the presumption does not enter the case.47 It is error to charge the
presumption where the railroad company has placed in evidence ample
testimony relating to the. manner of operating its trains at the time of the
injury, but a timely and clear withdrawal of such instruction will cure the
error. " And an instruction that the burden of evidence shifts to the defendant is error, since adequate rebuttal evidence results in the vanishing
of the presumption. 9 Where the defendant railroad has produced evidence
overcoming the presumption, and the plaintiff produces no further evidence
of negligence, a verdict for the defendant is demanded."
43. Railway Exp. Agency v. Mathis, 83 Ga. App. 415, 63 S.E.2d 921 (1951).
44. Section 94-1108 (1933).
45. Western & A.R. Co. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639, 49 S.Ct. 445, 73 L. Ed. 884 (1929);
4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1356, nn. 1, 10 (3d ed. 1940).

46. Sherrill v. Callaway, 83 Ga. App. 499, 61 S.E.2d 548 (1950). For a good summary
of the history and effect of the rule, see Maclntire, P. J., in Atlanta Coast Line
R. Co. v. Thomas, 83 Ga. App. 477, 64 S.E.2d 301 (1951). The effect of the presumption as to railroads in Georgia, a presumption the effect of which is to carry
a case to the jury, and which vanishes in the face of sufficient rebutting evidence,
is the only presumption of law recognized by Wigmore. (9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2491 (3d ed. 1940)). Such presumptions are not limited by Wigmore to injuries
by railroads but have general application. When overcome by rebutting evidence,
the presumption does not remain as evidence in the case. Of course, the facts giving
rise to it remain as evidence after it vanishes. Only a minority of the jurisdictions
hold that a presumption of law remains as evidence in the case after sufficient
rebutting evidence. 20 AM. JUR., Evidence § 166 (1939). See Note, 95 A.L.R. 878
(1935).
47. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Mercer, 82 Ga. App. 312, 60 S.E.2d 649 (1950).
48. Sylvania Central Ry. Co. v. Gay, 82 Ga. App. 486, 61 S.E.2d 587 (1950); Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co. v. Rowe, 83 Ga. App. 733, 64 S.E.2d 689 (1951).
49. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Rowe, 83 Ga. App. 540, 64 S.E.2d 216 (1951).
50. Callison v. Savannah & Atlanta Ry. Co., 82 Ga. App. 666, 62 S.E.2d 408 (1950).
As to private crossings, even though the person injured may be a trespasser, the
railroad company is duty bound to use ordinary care to anticipate his presence and
avoid injuring him. Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Sharpe, 83 Ga. App. 12, 62 S.E.2d
427 (1950). Although as a matter of law, the stop, look and listen rule does not
obtain in Georgia, it is error to charge the jury that failure to stop, look and
listen is not negligence as a matter of law, but such charge is corrected by a
further charge stating that whether failure to do so is negligence under the cir-

TORTS

1951]

Res Ipsa Loquitur.-The requirements and limitation of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur have been restated. The plaintiff's action was based on
alleged negligence of the defendant in processing, packing, and placing on
the market a certain baby food consisting of strained peas, put up in a sealed
glass jar. While the plaintiff, a young child, was being fed some of the
peas from the original container, by her mother, a piece of glass was found
in the plaintiff's mouth. The jar of peas had been purchased from a retailer. It was urged by the plaintiff's counsel that "there being evidence
that the piece of glass was found in the baby's mouth while she was being
fed from the glass jar, this is direct evidence that the picee of glass came
from the jar containing the peas, and raised an inference that the defendant
had not used ordinary care in the preparation of this food, and was sufficient to carry the case to the jury for their application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur." The court rejected this contention, because it would involve
an inference resting only on another inference. The court further said
that "the circumstantial evidence on behalf of the plaintiff as to the source
of the piece of glass is not a sufficient basis from which a fair inference
could be drawn that the defendant was negligent in processing, packing,
and distributing the glass jar of food."'" As indicated in the opinion, before
the doctrine can be resorted to in aid of plaintiff's case, there must be
proof of the origin of the force or thing that injured the plaintiff. Thereafter an inference of negligence may arise if the requirements for application of the doctrine are present. The origin of the injury must be proved,
but negligence may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the
injury. Unlike the presumption of negligence as to injuries caused by the
running of trains, the inference of res ipsa loquitur remains in the case as
,evidence and may be considered by the jury along with all other evidence.52
Pleading in Tort Cases.-The plaintiff brought an action for damages
suffered in the loss of services of his wife and for medical bills and other
expenses incurred by him as a result of the battery committed on her, and
additional damages allowable under the Code. It was alleged that the
plaintiff while distributing union literature, standing on a public street in
front of defendant's plant, he was attacked and beaten by one of the named
defendants while another held the crowd off with a shot gun. The injuriessuffered by the wife were inflicted on her when she came to his assistance.
It was further alleged that the defendant corporation "procured the commission of the wrong by advice, counsel, and persuasion." To meet special
demurrers the plaintiff alleged, by way of amendment, that the names of
the persons who had advised, counseled and persuaded the commission
of "the wrong are unknown to the plaintiff but well known to the defendant; and that the same is true with reference to the date or dates on
which this was done" and that the same is true as to the conspiracy. Defendant corporation demurred generally and specially. The demurrers
were overruled. On appeal the judgment was affirmed.'- The court applied
cumstances is a question for the jury. Atlanta & W.P.R. Co. v. Gilbert, 82 Ga. App.
244, 60 S.E.2d 787 (1950).

51. Miller v. Gerber Products Co., 207 Ga. 385, 62 S.E.2d 174 (1950).
52. Cole v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 65 Ga. App. 204, 15 S.E.2d 543 (1941).
53. American Thread Co. v. Rochester, 82 Ga. App. 873, 62 S.E.2d 602 (1950).
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the doctrine laid down in Pierce v. Seaboard A. L. Ry 4 to the effect that a
petition which "set forth the time when, the place at which, and the circumstances under which the 'injury' occurred, and alleged that it was the
result of the negligence of the officers, agents and servants of the de-.
fendant, was not subject to special demurrer raising the objection that
the names of such officers, agents, and servants were not set forth in the
petition." In this case, said the court, "Where the defendant corporation.
is in a better position than the plaintiff to determine who acted in its behalf, and the plaintiff alleges that he does not know the name of the
agent and has no means of obtaining the information, and where the time,
place, and all the circumstances of the occurrence which brought about the
alleged injury are stated with great particularity, it should be an easy
matter for the defendant corporation to ascertain the names of the agents
who were responsible, if responsibility existed, or were blameless if the
charge was unfounded, and we do not think that the failure to allege the.
name55of the agent is sufficient to dismiss the petition on special demurrer."
Election of Rentedies.-A petition alleging damages to plaintiff by
reason of defendant's improper and negligent installation of a water
heater in plaintiff's dwelling and further alleging by way of amendmentdamages by reason of breach of contract without striking the original
allegations, is duplicitous and subject to special demurrer.
Covenant Not to Sue.-Though somewhat confusing, a covenant not
to sue will be a good defense as to the person who is the promisee, but will
not release the other joint tortfeasors, whereas a release of one joint
tortfeasor will release all. The doctrine of a covenant not to sue was
applied to a case when executed lis pendensY" But where such covenant is
executed the consideration given by the promisee is deductible from the
verdict rendered against the other joint tortfeasors
Survival of Actions and Causes of Action.-The plaintiff, as administratrix, sued the defendant for damages to real and personal property of
the decreased and the deceased's medical and burial expenses due to defendant's negligence in installing a hot water heater. By the explosion due
to such negligence the owner of the residence was fatally injured and died
54. 122 Ga. 664 (2), 50 S.E. 468, 469 (1905).
55. 82 Ga. App. at 887, 62 S.E.2d at 611. But it should be noted that an injury inflicted by the operation of a railroad must needs be brought about by its servants.
whereas in the instant case the injury need not be done by the defendant's agent.
In the former situation, the link between the corporation through its servants and
the injury must be present whereas in the latter the injury may occur without this
link. Where the relation of the corporation to the injury must be supplied by facts,
the allegations in the petition should show a necessary connection. Furthermore,
the Pierce case is based on negligence and the instant case on an intentional tort.
56. Salmon Butane Gas & Appliance Co. v. Walraven, 82 Ga. App. 799, 62 S.E.2d 418
(1950). Where the plaintiff sued jointly both principal and agent, for breach of
implied warranty, the court held that the action sounded in contract and not tort,
since plaintiff did not seek damages for injury to person or property but for
breach of contract and consequently could not join as defendants principal and
agent as in a tort action. Hardy v. Leonard, 82 Ga. App. 764, 62 S.E.2d 437 .(1950).
57. Register v. Andris, 83 Ga. App. 632, 64 S.E.2d 196 (1951). A strong dissenting
opinion doubted the soundness of the distinction between a release and a covenant
not to sue and contended further that the latter, when executed while the suit:
was pending, was an anomaly and should be accorded no validity.
58. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ouzts, 82 Ga. App. 36, 60 S.E.2d 770 (1950).
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the next day before an action was brought. The court said that by the Code
a pending action will survive, but as to survival of the cause of action,
recourse must be had to the common law. An old English statute which
provided for survival of causes of action for injuries to personal property
became a part of the common law of Georgia. Consequently in the instant
case recovery is allowable for injury to the personal property, but not for
damage to the realty, injuries to the person and medical and funeral expenses. 9
While the action for libel in Doyal v. .4tlantaJournal Co."0 was pending
in the Court of Appeals, the Atlanta Journal Company and the Constitution Publishing Company were consolidated into a new corporation, the
Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. Thereafter the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision against the Atlanta Journal Company and the case was remitted to
the superior court where under motion the Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., was
substituted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that a pending action
for libel against one of the constitutent corporations did not abate against
the resulting consolidated corporation, and that the name of the resulting
corporation could be substituted as defendant. Though the statutes do not
cover specifically pending suits, they include debts, and plaintiff in a libel
suit is a creditor from the time of the utterance of the words. Furthermore,
since the defendant is liable as a consolidated corporation, this covers
punitive damages for the defendant is in a position to publish a libel as
well as the former corporation and may thus be deterred therefrom."
MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY ACT

A thorough analysis and discussion of this act"2 would require far more
space than can be accorded to this paper. Only the main features of the
act can be noted here. In the first place, the procedure provided does not
come into operation until an accident occurs. As defined in the act, accidents are of two types. (I) Those involving a collision of any motor
vehicle with another vehicle or with any object in which any person is
killed or injured or in which damage to the property of any person in
excess of $So is sustained. (2) Conviction of certain offenses involving the
operation of a motor vehicle.
I. From the first class of accidents, certain obligations follow. A report
in writing has to be made to the director within ten days. Within 20 days
after the receipt of the report, security must be filed with the director or
evidence of satisfactory adjustment or nonliability judicially determined.
Then within sixty days after receipt of the report, the director shall suspend
59. Davis v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 82 Ga. App. 460, 61 S.E.2d 510 (1950). The excep-

tion as to personal property was applied in a trover action for conversion of timber

cut and removed from deceased's land, the action being brought after the owner's
death. Williams v. Carrison, 82 Ga. App. 468, 61 S.E.2d 516 (1950). A cause of
action survives as to injuries to an automobile, the action being brought after
the death of the owner. Jackson v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 82 Ga. App. 498, 61
S.E.2d 586 (1950). It should be noted that although a cause of action may not
survive the death of the person injured, it does survive the death of the wrongdoer.
GA. CODE; § 3-505 (1933).
60. 82 Ga. App. 321, 60 S.E.2d 802 (1950).
61. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. Doyal, 84 Ga. App. 122, 65 S.E.2d 432 (1951).
62. Ga. Laws 1951, p. 565.
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operating licenses and registrations of the parties involved, unless the
operator or owner had insurance or other security sufficient to cover the
damages that might be incurred or the injury or damage was to the owner
or operator alone. Even though a license and registration are suspended,
renewals thereof are provided if the required security or certain other
evidence is filed with the director.
2. After the second type of accident, the director must suspend the
owner's or operator's license and registration for a period of three years.
But these privileges must be restored after 6o days, if security or insurance to the extent of $s,ooo for the bodily injury or death of one person
and $io,ooo for two or more persons, and property damage to the extent
of $i,ooo, is submitted.
The security required under the act is limited to $5,ooo where one
person is injured or killed, and $io,ooo for two or more persons; and
property damage to the extent of $i,ooo. But the director may use his
discretion within these limits with respect to accidents of the first but not
of the second class, except after the expiration of six months.
The director is required to furnish an abstract of the operation records
of any person upon request. But such records cannot be used as evidence
in any civil suit.
The act has accomplished a worthy purpose, but it leaves much to be
desired which it is hoped may be corrected by future legislation. One suggestion w~uld be the requirement of the security before and not after an
accident, and as a condition precedent to the issuance of a motor vehicle
registration certificate and license plate.

